Private Contract Signatures

Private Contract Signatures are a cryptography primitive which we need for the Secure Contract Signing Protocol.

It was introduced in Abuse-free optimistic contract signing by Garay, Jakobsson, MacKenzie (1999).

This page aims to give an outline of what they achieve, and how to implement them.

Specifications

$\textrm{SPCS}^T_S(m)$ denotes a Private Contract Signatures by $Pi$ in $S$ on contract m with Trusted Third Party $T$. The object is such that:

• It can be created any of the $Pi$’s in $S$ and, in the eyes of an external party, faked by any other of the $Pj$’s in $S$;
• The creating $Pi$, or $T$, are able to convert it into $\textrm{SIG}^T_{i}(m)$, and other $Pj$’s can be convinced of this.

Some Cryptography

The following must be understood first. In particular, the description of $PCS$ we give uses the notations introduced there.

Outline of ElGamal encryption, which are encryption and signature schemes.

Outline of Sigma protocols, which are composable, interactive zero-knowledge proof schemes.

Standard scheme

A private contract signature $\textrm{PCS}_S(m,n)$ is

$$\textrm{NI}\left( \bigvee_{i\in S} (\textrm{CCE}^T(i,n)\wedge\textrm{Schnorr}_i) \right)(m)$$

Intuitively:

• It constitutes a proof that one of the $Pi$ has passed the Schnorr identification test on challenge $H(g_i^{s_i},m)$.
• This amounts to having signed $m$, just like in the Schnorr signature scheme.
• Except that we do not know, yet, which of the $Pi$ has signed.
• In order to convert this into a signature by $Pi$, one must prove that the cyphertext $n$ has content the integer $i$.

A private contract signature revealer $\textrm{RPCS}_i(n)$ is

$$\textrm{NI}\left( \textrm{CCE}^T(i,n)\vee\textrm{CCD}^T(i,n) \right)(m)$$

Intuitively:

• It constitutes a proof that the cyphertext $n$ has content the integer $i$.
• Either $Pi$ or $T$ can produce this.

A contract signature $\textrm{SIG}_i(m)$ is

$$\left(\textrm{PCS}_S(m,n),\textrm{RPCS}_i(n)\right)$$

Intuitively:

• It constitutes a combined proof that $Pi$ has passed the Schnorr identification test on challenge $H(g_i^{s_i},m)$.
• This amounts to having signed $m$, just like in the Schnorr signature scheme.

Simplified scheme (Failed attempt)

An $\textrm{SPCS}^T_S(m)$ is

$$\textrm{NI}\left(\bigvee_{i\in S}\textrm{CCE}^T(H(m),(\textrm{Pub}^{Pi},v))\right)(g^s,H(g^s,m))$$

with $s$ random. Intuitively:

• It constitutes a proof that $v={H(m)}{\textrm{Pub}^T}$ under ElGamal, with ephemeral key one of ${\textrm{Priv}^{Pi}}{i\in S}$.
• In order to provide such a proof one needs to have the ephemeral key used.
• Thus, whoever has done it, has admittedly signed $m$.
• But in order to know which of the $Pi$ has signed, one needs a proof of which of private keys was used.

To unravel it, means to convert $\textrm{SPCS}^T_S(m)$ into the final signature $\textrm{SIG}^T_{i\in S}(m)$:

$$\textrm{NI}\left(\textrm{CCE}^T(H(m),(\textrm{Pub}^{Pi},v))\vee\textrm{CCD}^T(H(m),(\textrm{Pub}^{Pi},v))\right)(g^{s'},H(g^{s'},m))$$

with $s’$ random. Intuitively:

• In order to accomplish the conversion one needs to either have $\textrm{Priv}_{Pi}$ used as ephemeral key, or to have $\textrm{Priv}_T$.
• It constitutes a proof that $v={H(m)}{\textrm{Pub}^T}$ under ElGamal with ephemeral key $\textrm{Priv}{Pi}$, which amounts to$Pi$signing$m$.
• No step discloses $\textrm{Priv}_{Pi}$.

This scheme is simpler than the original scheme. It has dangerous weaknesses, however:

• By requiring that $\textrm{Priv}{Pi}- be the ephemeral key for ElGamal encryption, we are imposing that the pairs $(\textrm{Priv}{Pi},\textrm{Pub}^{Pi})$and$(\textrm{Priv}_{T},\textrm{Pub}^{T})$ are based on the same Diffie-Hellman group. Altogether, this would mean that all pairs get generates with respect to the same group. This is non-traditional, and may weaken security? Nevertheless, notice that precise, fixed groups have been recommended for use, for instance in RFC 5114.
• The same ephemeral key $\textrm{Priv}{Pi}$is reused over and over, which means that the cyphertext is always$H(m)g^{\textrm{Priv}{Pi}\textrm{Priv}{T}}$but since$H(m)$is known, so is$g^{\textrm{Priv}{Pi}\textrm{Priv}_{T}}$, and so the next time$Pi$is immediately identified as the creator of the$SPCS$.
• Worse even, $Pi$’s signature, once it has been used once, can then be forged, since signing amounts to multiply by $g^{\textrm{Priv}{Pi}\textrm{Priv}{T}}$ in this scheme.